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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
THOMAS B. MOONEY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, . 
vs. 
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
7373 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A prior appeal in this case taken by the plaintiff from 
an order dismissing the action, pursuant to a motion of the 
defendant based upon the grounds of forum non conveniens 
was disposed of in an opinion reported in 221 P. 2d 628. 
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This Court held that the courts of this State are not 
required by any statutory or constitutional mandate to en-
tertain suits of non-residents based upon an alleged viola-
tion of the Federal Employers' Liability Act occuring out-
side this State, but concluded that the lower court abused its 
discretion in dismissing the action under the circumstances 
revealed by the evidence then in the record. The order of 
dismissal was vacated and the cause remanded with direc-
tions to permit both parties to present evidence in support 
of or in opposition to the motion (221 P. 2d at 649). Pur-
suant to this direction, the defendant renewed its motion 
to dismiss, supporting the same by an affidavit of one of 
its attorneys (R. 17-25). One of plaintiff's attorneys filed 
on his behalf an affidavit in opposition to the defendant's 
motion to dismiss (R. 27). This affidavit admitted parts 
and denied parts of the affidavit of defendant's attorney 
(R. 27-29). Upon the hearing of defendant's renewed mo-
tion to dismiss, it introduced evidence in support of the 
motion (R. 36-37). The plaintiff offered no evidence in 
opposition <R. 57). The trial court denied the motion (R. 
34). No findings of fact, conclusions of law, or judgment 
·other than the minute entry of the order was made or en-
tered. 
Plaintiff, a brakeman on a work train, was injured on 
January 5, 1949, when he fell from a car described in the 
pleadings and evidence as a Jordan Spreader car, which 
was standing on a side track in the defendant's yard at 
Tabernash, Colorado (R. 219-220). The Jordan Spreader 
car may be briefly described as a snow plow (R. 219). It 
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consists of flanges with attachments to operate the same, 
all of which are mounted on an ordinary railroad flat car 
(R. 219) (Exhibit C). It is used to remove snow from 
the railroad tracks and also to spread ballast on the road 
bed. It is equipped with a hand brake (Exhibit C). 
The brake on the Spreader consists of a perpendicular 
shaft extending above and below the top surface of the 
car at the end thereof and over toward one side. Under-
neath the car the shaft or staff is connected with a mech-
anism by which, when the shaft is rotated, it tightens or 
releases the brake shoes. Attached to the top of the shaft 
is a wheel which is turned in applying or releasing the 
brake. Attached to the shaft at the top surface of the car 
is a ratchet, the rotation of which is controlled by a pawl. 
When the wheel is turned to apply the brake, the pawl 
engages the ratchet and holds the brake in a fixed position 
until released. The brake shoes may also be set by air (R. 
254-255) (Exhibit C). In order to release the brake after 
the air has been let out, it is necessary to tighten it enough 
to release the tension on the pawl. The latter may then be 
disengaged from the ratchet by kicking it or by hand. Ac-
cording to the testimony of the plaintiff, the pawl was 
covered with ice, and frozen in the ratchet (R. 258). He 
picked up a brake shoe and pounded on the pawl to jar it 
loose from the ice. He says he then tightened the brake and 
disengaged the pawl. According to the plaintiff's version, 
the brake shaft was bent, and when he released the pawl, 
the shaft whirled and threw him from the car (R. 258-259). 
The present appeal is from the judgment in favor of 
plaintiff entered upon a jury verdict. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY UPON ISSUES NOT WITHIN THE 
PLEADINGS OR SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO IN-
STRUCT THE JURY WITH RESPECT TO THE 
PLAINTIFF'S CONDUCT BEING THE SOLE 
CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT AND INJURY. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO IN-
STRUCT THE JURY THAT NO PRESUMP-
TION OF LIABILITY ARISES OUT OF THE 
FACT OF INJURY AND THAT PLAINTIFF 
MUST PROVE NEGLIGENCE TO RECOVER 
UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIA-
BILITY AGT. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFEND-
ANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS UPON THE 
GROUND OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY UPON ISSUES NOT WITHIN THE 
PLEADINGS OR SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE. 
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The original complaint predicated liability upon a 
violation of the Safety Appliance Act, Title 45, Section 
11, U. S. C. A., which provides "it shall be unlawful for 
any common carrier subject to the provisions of Section 
1-16 of this title to haul or permit to be hauled or used on 
its line, any car subject to the provisions of said sections 
not equipped with appliances provided for in Section 16 
of this Title, to wit: All cars m~st be equipped with se-
cure sill steps and efficient hand brakes." It was alleged 
that the hand brake on the Jordan Spreader car was in-
efficient, dangerous and unsafe in that it was likely to 
release unexpectedly, that the staff was sprung and bent 
(R. 1-5). On the opening of the trial, plaintiff was per-
mitted to file an amendment to his complaint by adding 
to Paragraph VI of the complaint two additional subpara-
graphs (D) and (E). Paragraph VI of the complaint al-
leged that the defendant was careless, reckless, and negli-
gent and acted in violation of the Federal Safety Appli-
ance Act in the particulars set forth in the subparagraphs 
A, B, and C, which as above indicated, related solely to 
the inefficiency of the brake. Subparagraph D of the 
amendment to the complaint alleged simply that the de-
fendant, in violation of the Safety Appliance Act, used a 
Jordan Spreader car equipped with an inefficient, danger-
ous, and unsafe hand brake in this: that the area upon the 
car around the brake did not provide a safe and adequate 
place for a workman to station himself while manipulating 
the hand brake. Subparagraph E of the Amendment to 
the complaint alleged that the defendant failed to furnish 
plaintiff a reasonable safe place wherein and whereon to 
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do and perform the ordinary duties of his employment in 
that the defendant requi:tzed the plaintiff to release the 
hand brake on the Jordan Spreader car at a time when the 
area upon said car around said ·brake did not provide a 
safe and adequate place to position himself while manipu-
lating said hand brake (R. 76-77). 
The court submitted to the jury the issue of liability 
under the Safety Appliance Act and in that connection in-
structed them that if they determined that the plaintiff 
had proved a violation of this act and that such violation 
contributed to the plaintiff's injuries, they could not make 
any deduction from the plaintiff's damages by reason of his 
contributory negligence if any. 
Trial court also submitted to the jury an issue of negli-
gence under the Federal Employers' Liability Act and in 
that connection instructed the jury that if they found such 
negligence to exist and if it contributed to the plaintiff's 
injuries, they could diminish the plaintiff's damages in 
proportion to the contributory negligence if any of the 
plaintiff. The jury, by its verdict, did diminish the plain-
tiff's damage because of the contributory negligence of the 
plaintiff (R. 141). The legal effect therefore of the jury's 
verdict is that it has absolved the defendant from any 
liability predicated upon the alleged vioLation of the Safety 
Appliance Act. It is legally equivalent to a finding by the 
jury that the hand brake on the Jordan Spreader was not 
an inefficient hand brake and that its staff was not sprung 
or bent. 
The issue of negligence was submitted to the jury in 
Instruction No. Six, which reads as follows : 
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"You are instructed that under the provisions of 
the Federal Employers' Liability Act applicable to 
this case the law imposes the duty upon the defend-
ant company to exercise reasonable care to provide 
its employees with a reasonably safe place to work. 
This duty does not require the absolute elimination 
of all danger, but it does require the elimination of 
all dangers which the exercise of reasonable care by 
the railroad company could remove or guard against. 
"In this connection I instruct you, therefore, 
that if you shall find from a preponderance of the 
evidence that the deck of the Jordan Spreader sur-
rounding the brake staff had tools, chains, or other 
objects thereon which required plaintiff to stand in 
a place from which he could not operate the hand 
brake in reasonable safety, then and in that event 
you may consider such facts, if any, in ascertaining 
whether or not the defendant company is negligent 
under the terms of the Federal Employers' Liability 
Act. And if you further find from a preponderance 
of the evidence that such negligence, if any, proxi-
mately caused, in whole or in part, injuries to plain-
tiff, then you should return a verdict in favor of the 
plaintiff and against the defendant and award plain-
tiff damages as in these instructions set forth." 
It is the contention of the defendant that the trial 
court committed prejudicial error in so instructing the 
jury, for the reason first that there is no evidence to sup-
port a finding by the jury that the defendant was negli-
gent in failing to move from the deck of the Jordan 
Spread "tools, chains, or other objects thereon," or that 
any failure to remove from the deck of the spreader any 
tools, chains, or other objects thereon caused either in whole 
or in part the accident or injury of which the plaintiff 
complains. 
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The only evidence in this record concerning the ex-
istence of any "tools, chains, or othe·r objects" on the deck 
of the spreader is to be found in the testimony of the plain-
tiff. He testified that he was standing on the east side of 
the spreader when the conductor directed him to release 
the brakes; that he climbed over the coupling to the west 
side of the spreader and mounted the car from that side; 
(R. 254) that he went over to that side because there was 
a tool box "and other stuff, chain and things like that" 
on the east side of the spreader and he thought it was safer 
to get on the car from the west side ( R. 254 and 304 and 
309) . When asked about the condition of the floor of the 
car at the place of the brake staf;f, he stated, "Well, behind 
me was a grab iron and there was very little room to stand 
and there was stuff scattered all over there. Tools had 
been thrown on there after we had done some work with 
the spreader at Granby. We had a little trouble with the 
flanges sticking out and the tools were taken off and 
thrown back on again." He then identified Exhibit "C" as 
an accurate photograph of the Jordan Spreader taken a 
few days before the trial. When asked if there was any 
difference between the corner where the brake is located 
and the area of the deck of the car as shown in Exhibit 
"C" and at the time of the accident, plaintiff stated that 
Exhibit "C" did not show the tool box. The brake staff 
was located six inches from the south end of the car, twenty 
inches from the center and sixteen inches from the side of 
the car (R. 309). 
On cross examination, plaintiff stated: 
"Q. Isn't it a fact when you climbed up on the 
west side of the car you climbed up there because 
this side was cleaned off? 
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"A. It had been tramped down by getting up 
and down off that side. 
"Q. And comparatively speaking, it was 
cleaned off? 
"A. It wasn't cleaned off. Men had been 
climbing up and working and had tromped it down. 
"Q. But there weren't tools and equipment on 
that side? 
"A. No, sir. There was a chain lying some-
where there and a brake shoe somewhere in the 
vicinity. 
"Q. That didn't in anyway interfere with you 
up there. 
"A. No, not for my foot space (R. 309). * * * 
"Q. So that I take it, after you had climbed 
up in this position with your feet in approximately 
the position indicated on that drawing, that you 
then braced your feet. Did you not? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. And you had a firm stance on the deck of 
the car in that position? 
"A. Well, I had hold of the wheel to help me 
make my feet firm. 
"Q. The rules require you to get a firm stance, 
don't they, before you operate a brake? 
"A. In this particular instance it was very 
hard to really pick out a good place that was good 
and firm and safe. 
"Q. You did get a firm stance on the deck of 
the car, didn't you ? 
"A. I got the best I could get for the condi-
tions. 
"Q. Well, there wasn't anything about the way 
you were standing that in anyway contributed to 
your accident was there? 
"A. No, sir" (R. 311-312). 
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The staff of the brake was about three feet above the 
floor of the car and the wheel by me,ans of which the brake 
is released would strike a workman of average height about 
at the waist (R. 310). 
We submit that this evidence fails completely to es-
tablish any negligence on the part of the defendant in fail-
ing to remove from the deck of the spreader any tools, 
chains, or other objects. It will be noted that the Jordan 
Spreader car was an ordinary flat car, and, therefore, does 
not have any brake platform or deck. The brake mechan-
ism is simply attached to the floor of the car. It is also 
to be kept in mind that the Jordan Spreader car was a snow 
plow used to clear the tracks of snow. It was a part of a 
work train and not a car used in the transportation of 
freight. The presence of tools, chains, or other objects on 
the floor- of such a piece of equipment is perfectly normal, 
natural, and to be expected. Any failure to remove such 
objects from the floor of the car prior to directing a work-
man to release the brake could not within the realm of 
reason be determined a breach of the duty to provide the 
brakeman a safe place in which to perform his duties. 
Furthermore, as the evidence demonstrates, any "chains, 
tools, or other objects" that may have been on the floor of 
the Jordan Spreader car did not in any manner interfere 
with the plaintiff's operations in releasing the brake. He 
did not stumble over, slip on, or stand on any "chain, tool, 
or other object" while releasing or attem·pting to release 
the brake. There was ample space between the tool box 
which was on the floor of the spreader and the brake 
ratchet for the plaintiff to stand while releasing the brake. 
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He did stand in that position and did release the brake 
without coming in contact in anyway with any "chain, tool, 
or other object" that may have been on the floor of the 
spreader. There is not the remotest causal connection 
between the accident sustained by the plaintiff and 
the presence of any "tools, chains, or other objects" 
that may have been "lying around" on the car. The con-
dition of the floor of the car neither caused or contributed 
in the slightest degree to the fall of the plaintiff from the 
car. He testified positively and unequivocally that he was. 
thrown from the car by the whirling of the brake staff 
following his disengaging the pawl. His description of the 
accident removes even the remotest possibility that the con-
dition of the floor of the car contributed in the slightest 
degree to the fall from the car. We quote from his testi-
mony. 
"Q. Did you release the brake on the spreader 
on this occasion? 
''A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. Tell us what happened. 
"A. I climbed there and there was snow and 
ice froze all over the deck of the car and it had been 
quite cold the night before, around 20 below, and I 
seen a brake shoe lying there and I thought if I 
would pound on the dog or jar it it would knock the 
ice off a little, and I wouldn't have that to contend 
with when I was releasing it. I did that, and I pro-
ceeded to release the brake in the normal manner 
by pulling and straining on the brake to get the dog 
out. I had my foot against the dog. It had to come 
out just a very little to free the brake, and I was 
pulling as hard as I could against it and pushing 
with my foot against the dog and when it released 
it threw me off. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
"Q. What was it that threw you off? 
"A. The brake staff was bent and when it 
came around it came around with a whirl and threw 
me backward. Otherwise it would come around 
straight up and down, but being bent it had a ten-
dency to unwind (R. 258). * * * 
"Q. What was the next thing you knew after 
you were whirled off? 
"A. I came to on the ground" (R. 259). 
Plaintiff did not qualify, add to, or deduct from the 
foregoing version of the manner in which he sustained his 
injury. Nothing is more clearly established in this case 
than the fact that plaintiff was thrown from the car by 
the spinning of the brake wheel or the whirling of the staff, 
and that the presence of any chains, tools, or other objects 
on the floor of the car was merely a static condition which 
played no part in the accident in which the plaintiff sus-
tained his injury. Numerous authorities sustained these 
conclusions. 
See: 
Brady v. Southern Ry. Co., 64 S. Ct. 232, 320 
u. s. 476; 
Reynolds v. Atlantic Coast R. R. Co., 69 S. Ct. 
507, 336 u. s. 207; 
Kenney v. Boston & Maine R. R., 33 Atl. 2d 
557, 92 N. H. 495; 
Central Vermont Railway Company v. Perry, 
10 F. 2d 132 (1st Cir.) ; 
Dade v. Boston & Maine R. R., 30 Atl. 2d 485, 
92 N. H. 294; 
Lowden v. Bowen, 183 P. 2d 980, (Okl.) ; 
Tremelling v. Southern Pacific Company, 170 
Pac. 80, 51 Utah 189; 
Ehalt v. McCarthy, et al., 138 P. 2d 639, 104 
Utah 110. 
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In Brady v. Southern Railway Company, supra, the 
deceased was fatally injured when thrown from a car in a 
moving train. The car was derailed when it ran over "the 
wrong" end of a derailer. One of the grounds of negligence 
alleged was that the rail opposite the derailer was weak 
and defective, being worn on top and on the side. Plaintiff 
claimed that if this rail had been without defect the car 
would have gone over the derailer and stayed on the tracks. 
The Supreme Court of the United States held that although 
there was sufficient evidence of a defect in the rail, such 
defect was not negligence causing in whole or in part the 
fatal injuries. We quote from the opinion: 
"The Supreme Court of North Carolina (222 N. 
C. at page 370, 23 S. E. 2d at page 338) was of the 
view that striking a derailer from the unexpected 
direction 'was so unusual, so contrary to the purpose' 
of the derailer that provision to guard against such 
a happening was beyond the requirement of due 
care. With this we agree. Bare possibility is not 
sufficient. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. 
S. 469, at page 475, 24 L. Ed. 256; 'But it is gener-
ally held, that, in order to warrant a finding that 
negligence, or an act not amounting to wanton 
wrong, is the proximAte cause of an injury it must 
appear that the injury was the natural and probable 
consequence of the negligence or wrongful act, and 
that it ought to have been foreseen in the light of 
the attending circumstances.' Events too remote to 
require reasonable provision need not be anticipated. 
* * *" 
The case of Reynolds v. Atlantic Coast R. Company, 
69 S. Ct. 507, 336 U. S. 207, is directly in point upon the 
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proposition that there is no causal connection between the 
condition of the floor of the car and the injury sustained 
by the plaintiff. In that case, a brakeman fell between the 
sixth and the seventh cars of a moving train. He was pro-
ceeding from the caboose to the seventh car in order to pass 
a signal. The complaint alleged that the railroad was neg-
ligent in allowing canes to grow alongside the roadbed and 
in failing to provide an additional brakeman. It was claimed 
that if the canes had been removed from the side of the 
roadbed the deceased could have given the signal from the 
sixth car and further, that if an additional brakeman had 
been provided, the deceased would not have had to give a 
signal from the moving cars. The Supreme Court of the 
United States conceded that the railroad might properly 
have been held guilty of negligence under the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act in failing to remove the canes from 
alongside the tracks and in failing to provide an additional 
brakeman, but held that there was no causal connection be-
. tween such negligence and the fall of the brakeman between 
the moving cars. 
Having demonstrated the total absence of any causal 
connection between the presence of any tools, chains, or 
other objects on the floor of the Jordan Spreader and the 
fall of the plaintiff from that car, it necessarily follows 
that the court committed prejudicial error in instructing 
the jury that if such negligence proximately caused in 
whole or in part the injuries to the plaintiff, it should 
return a verdict in favor· of the plaintiff. 
In the case of King v. The Denver and Rio Grande 
Western Railroad Company, 211 P. 2d 833, . . Utah .. , 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
the deceased was killed when a car which he was riding 
ran over a trestle. The court permitted the jury to deter-
mine that if the brake on the car was not an efficient hand 
brake within the meaning of the Safety Appliance Act, the 
plaintiff could recover. There was no evidence in the case 
tending to show that the brake was defective or inefficient. 
This Court reversed the judgment of the lower court be-
cause it had permitted the plaintiff to recover upon a basis 
unsupported by the evidence. See also, Fowkes v. J. I. Case 
Threshing l'tfach. Co., 46 Utah 502, 151 Pac. 53; KendaU 
v. Fordham, 79 Utah 256, 9 P. 2d 183; Industrial Comm. 
v. Wasatch. Grading Co., 80 Utah 223, 14 P. 2d 988; Peter-
son v. Sorenson, 91 Utah 507, 65 P. 2d 12. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO IN-
STRUCT THE JURY WITH RESPECT TO THE 
PLAINTIFF'S CONDUCT BEING THE SOLE 
CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT AND INJURY. 
Defendant requested the court to instruct the jury that 
if they believed from the evidence that the sole cause of. 
the accident and injury sustained by the plaintiff was his 
failure to use a brake club properly to release the brake, 
their verdict must be in favor of the defendant. (Defend-
ant's requested Instruction No. 6.) 
The plaintiff had been instructed by the conductor 
in c·harge of the train crew ·to use a brake club to re-
lease the brake on the Jordan Spreader (R. 472). The 
plaintiff disobeyed this instruction. Even if this in-
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struction had not been given to the plaintiff, the simpl-
est degree of ordinary prudence would have dictated 
that plaintiff use a brake club to release this brake. The 
Jordan Spreader was standing on a grade track. The wea-
ther was extremely cold and undoubtedly the rails were 
slippery. In view of these conditions, the brake on the 
Jordan Spreader had been set very tight. The plaintiff was 
familiar with all of these conditions and circumstances. 
Nevertheless, he undertook to release the brake without any 
implement by which he could regulate the tension of the 
brake. Instead he used a brake shoe to pound loose the pawl 
and having only his hands to control the tension after the 
pawl had been disengaged. Had he used a brake club in 
releasing the brake, he could have readily and easily pre-
vented the staff from spinning and whirling (R. 433). In 
short, he could have avoided the accident and injury by 
obeying the instruction of his superior, or following the dic-
tates of the most elementary prudence. In this state of the 
evidence, well settled principles of law entitled the defend-
ant to have the jury instructed that if they found that the 
sole cause of the accident and injury was the plaintiff's 
failure to use a brake club to release the brake, their verdict 
must be in favor of the defendant. 
A case directly in point is Hen wood v. Coburn, 165 F. 
2d 418. In this case Coburn, the conductor in charge of a 
freight train, was fatally injured when the caboose in 
which he was riding was struck by a passenger train. It 
was Coburn's duty to require the flagman to set a warning 
signal to the passenger train of the location of the caboose. 
There was evidence from which the jury could have de-
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termined that Coburn failed to see to it that the flagman 
put out the proper signals, and that the passenger train 
ran into the caboose because of the absence of such warn-
ing. The action to recover damages for his death was 
predicated upon the Federal Employers' Liability Act, and 
the defendant railroad requested an instruction as follows: 
"And you are also instructed that even if you 
should find and believe from the evidence that the 
flagman left the caboose in time to flag the passen-
ger train, still if you further find that he returned 
to the caboose at a time when there was danger of 
a collision between the passenger train and freight 
train number 681, and if you find that conductor 
Coburn permitted him to return to the caboose and 
to remain in the caboose under such circumstances, 
and if you find that conductor Coburn was negli-
gent in so permitting the flagman to return to the 
caboose and to remain in it, and that such negligence 
was the sole cause of the collision between the two 
trains, then you are instructed that the plaintiff is 
not entitled to recover and your verdict must be 
for the defendant." 
This request was refused although the court did instruct 
as follows: 
"In order for this defense to prevail, you will 
be required to find from the evidence that there 
was no other negligence on the part of the defend-
and or any of its officers, employees, or agents that 
proximately caused the collision in question and 
that the plaintiff's intestate was guilty of the sole 
and only negligence that caused the collision." 
The Circuit Court of Appeals held that inasmuch as 
there was evidence from which the jury could determine 
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that Coburn was negligent and that such negligence was 
the sole cause of the collision, the trial court committed 
prejudicial error in refusing to submit such defense to the 
jury, and that the instruction given did n<~t adequately 
present the defendant's defense : 
"The point we are trying to make is that the 
considerations which presumably prompted the trial 
court to refuse to give the trustee's requested in-
struction No. 2 were not questions which the court 
had a right to resolve in favor of the administratrix 
as a matter of law in deciding whether the requested 
instruction should be given or refused. As we have 
pointed out, under the teaching of the recent de-
cisions of the Supreme Court, the domain of the jury 
in circumstantial cases under the Federal Employers' 
Lia;bility Act may not be narrowly bounded, and the 
settling of any question of negligence or proximate 
cause, where more than one rational possibility is 
involved on the evidentiary facts, is exclusively with-
in its field. This is true for every purpose in the 
case, and, in according the jury its inherent func-
tion, recognition of the right in one aspect or in-
cident of a case is as important as in another 
* * · * As a matter of legal test, a jury in the 
latitude which is open to it might legitimately infer 
from the facts that, if Coburn knew that Story had 
returned to the caboose and failed to send him back 
out (which the witnesses on both sides agreed that 
a conductor should do in such a situation), this 
neglect of duty could have constituted the sole ef-
ficient cause of Coburn's death, if the jury should 
be of the view that on the Gircumstances which we 
have set out neither Story nor the engineer of the 
passenger train ought to be regarded as having been 
negligent. The trustee was therefore, we think, 
entitled to have had this theory submitted to the 
jury, as he sought to have done by his requested in-
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struction No. 2. What we recently said in another 
case may be repeated, that, 'as against a mere gen-
eral or abstract charge, a party is entitled to a 
specific instruction on his theory of the case, if there 
is evidence to support it and if a proper request for 
such an instruction is made.' Chicago & N. W. Ry. 
Co. v. Green, 8 Cir., 164 F. 2d 55, 61. The requested 
instruction here was in no way legally incorrect but, 
if the trial court desired to amplify or clarify it in 
any way, it of course was at liberty to do so." 
This court has repeatedly announced that a party to-
a lawsuit is entitled to have the jury pass upon his theory 
of the case when there is evidence to sustain it. See Pratt 
v. Utah Light and Traction Company, 57 Utah 7, 169 P. 
863; Webb v. Snow, 102 Utah 435, 132 P. 2d 144; State v. 
Newton, 105 Utah 561, 144 P. 2d 290. The proposition is 
stated succinctly in the Pratt case as follows: 
"Each party to a suit is entitled to have his 
theory, when there is evidence to support it, sub-
mitted to the jury and the judgment of the jury on 
the facts tending to support such theory assuming 
always that there is testimony offered to support 
the same." 
The issue embodied in the defendant's request was a 
controlling issue in the case, and the refusal of the court 
to submit it deprived the defendant of its right to have its 
principal defense passed upon by the jury. See Wilson v. 
Union Pacific Railroad Company, 231 P. 2d 715, ... Utah 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO IN-
STRUCT THE JURY THAT NO PRESUMP-
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TION OF LIABILITY ARISES OUT OF THE 
FACT OF INJURY AND THAT PLAINTIFF 
MUST PROVE NEGLIGENCE TO RECOVER 
UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIA-
BILITY ACT. 
In its Instruction No. 11, the defendant requested the 
court to instruct the jury that the defendant is not an 
insurer of the safety of any employees and is not liable to 
respond in damages merely because the plaintiff was in-
jured while engaged in the performance of his work as a 
brakeman ; that there is no presumption that the defendant 
was negligent or that it violated the Safety Appliance Act, 
or that such. negligence or violation on its part, even if 
established, was the proximate cause of the accident and 
injury to the plaintiff, and that negligence, if any, and 
violation of the act, if any, and whether such negligence or 
violation, if any, was the proximate cause of the accident 
and injury must be proved by the plaintiff by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. 
We submit that this request embodied correct prin-
ciples of law applicable to the evidence in the case and that 
the refusal to give it deprived the defendant of a fair trial. 
In denying defendant's request, the trial court apparently 
was under the impression that the Supreme Court of the 
United States has by its recent decisions abandoned its 
previously announced conceptions of the law of negligence 
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Such an im-
pression is entirely erroneous. That court has repeatedly 
declared that railroad companies are not insurers of the 
safety of their employees, that no presumption of liability 
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arises out of the fact that an employee is injured while 
acting in the course of his employment, and that proof of 
negligence causing the injury is a condition precedent to 
liability. See Moore v. Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Com-
pany, 340 U. S. 573, 71 S. Ct. 428; Tennant v. Peoria, etc., 
321 U.S. 29, 64 S. Ct. 409, 88 L. Ed. 520; Brady v. Southern 
Railway Company, 320 U. S. 476, 64 S. Ct. 232; 88 L. Ed. 
239; Coray v. Southern Pacific Company, 335 U. S. 520; 69 
S. Ct. 275; Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U. S. 53, 69 S. Ct. 
413, 93 L. Ed. 497. 
In the Wilkerson case, Mr. Justice Black delivering 
the opinion of the court said: 
"Much of the respondents' argument here is 
devoted to the proposition that the Federal Act does 
not make the railroad an absolute insurer against 
personal injury damages suffered by· its employees. 
That proposition is correct, since the Act imposes 
liability only for negligent injuries. Cf. Coray v. 
Southern Pac. Co., 335 U. S. 520, 69 S. Ct. 275. 
* * * " 
"There are some who think that recent decisions 
of this Court which have required submission of 
negligence questions to a jury make, 'for all prac-
tical purposes, a railroad ~n insurer of its em-
ployees.' See individual opinion of Judge Major, 
Griswold v. Gardner, 7 Cir., 155 F. 2d 333, 334. But 
see Judge Kerner's dissent from this view 155 F. 2d 
333, at page 337 and Judge Lindley's dissenting 
opinion 155 F. 2d 333, at pages 337, 338. This as-
sumption, that railroads are made insurers where 
the issue of negligence ·is left to the jury, is inad-
missible. It rests on another assumption, this one 
unarticulated, that juries will invariably decide neg-
ligence questions against railroads. This is con-
trary to fact, as shown for illustration by other 
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Federal Employers Liability cases, 
(Citing cases.) 
* * * 
Mr. Justice Douglas in a concurring opinion added: 
, 
"The Federal Employers' Liability Act was de-
signed to put on the railroad industry some of the 
cost for the legs, eyes, arms, and lives which it con-
sumed in its operations. Not all these costs were 
imposed, for the Act did not make the employer an 
insurer. The liability which it imposed was the 
liability for negligence. * * * The basis of lia-
bility under the Act is and remains negligence. 
* * *" 
The latest expression of the Supreme Court that we 
are able to find reaffirming the principles embodied in the 
requested instruction is set forth, in Moore v. Chesapeake 
and Ohio Railway Company, supra, as follows: 
"To recover under the Act, it was incumbent 
upon petitioner to prove negligence of respondent 
which caused the fatal accident. Tennant v. Peoria 
& P. U. R. Co., 321 U. S. 29, 32, 64 S. Ct. 409, 411, 
88 L. Ed. 520. The negligence she alleged was that 
respondent's engineer made a sudden and unex-
pected stop without warning, 'thereby causing de-
cedent to be thrown from a position of safety on the 
rear of the tender' into the path of the train. 
* * * The burden was upon petitioner to prove 
that decedent fell after the train stopped without 
warning, which was the act of negligence she charg-
ed. Her evidence showed he fell before the train 
stopped. * * *" 
Nowhere in its charge to the jury did the court direct 
them that the burden rested on the plaintiff to prove 
negligence causing the injury, or that they could not predi-
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cate liability upon the mere happening of the accident, or 
that the defendant was not an insurer of the safety of its 
employees. By refusing and failing to require the jury to 
apply these well settled principles of law to the evidence, 
the trial court authorized the jury to render a verdict for 
the plaintiff without requiring him to meet the conditions 
precedent to a recovery under the terms of the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act and prevented the defendant from 
having its defense to the action submitted to the jury for 
its determination. 
We need not cite again the numerous decisions of this 
court which hold it to be reversible error to refuse to sub-
mit to the jury a defense which is raised by the pleadings 
and supported by the evidence. We submit that the re-
fusal of the court to instruct the jury as requested in de-
fendant's Instruction No. 11 deprived the defendant of a 
fundamental right. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFEND-
ANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS UPON THE 
GROUND OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS. 
In its opinion vacating the Order of Judge Hendricks 
dismissing the action upon the grounds of forum non con-
veniens, this Court held specifically and unequivocally that 
the courts of this State have the power to refuse to hear or 
determine the plaintiff's cause of action. The exercise of 
that power was held to be the exercise of a sound legal 
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discretion. It was determined that the evidence then be-
fore Judge Hendricks was not sufficient to warrant a re-
fusal to entertain the action. 
It is the contention of the defendant upon the present 
appeal tha~ it supplied upon the retrial of its motion all 
of the. evidence which this Court determined necessary to 
justify a refusal to entertain the suit, and there being no 
evidence contradicting, impeaching, or in any other manner 
impairing the evidence presented by the defendant, the trial 
court did not exercise a sound judicial discretion in pro-
ceeding to hear and determine the case over the objection 
of the defendant. 
The renewed Motion to Dismiss was supported by the 
Affidavit of Clifford L. Ashton, one of the attorneys for 
the defendant. The facts set forth in the Affidavit were 
that the accident on account of which damages were claimed 
by the plaintiff occurred in January, 1949, at Tabernash, 
Colorado, some sixty-six miles from Denver, Colorado. That 
the plaintiff was at all times a resident of Denver, Colo-
rado. That the defendant is incorporated under the laws 
of the State of Delaware, operates a line of railroad in 
Colorado and Utah, and has its general offices and head-
quarters in Denver, where the major portion of its busi-
ness is carried on. That it is qualified to do business in the 
State of Utah. That the plaintiff's claim was predicated 
upon a violation of the Safety Appliance Act. That both 
federal and state courts are located in the City and County 
of Denver, and are open and have jurisdiction to entertain 
the plaintiff's present cause of action. That plaintiff's 
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action could be heard and determined with reasonable 
promptness in either of the state or federal courts in Den-
ver. That in order to defend the plaintiff's claim, it would 
be necessary to bring from Denver and nearby Golden, 
Colorado, a number of witnesses, estimated to be eleven. 
The distance which these witnesses would be required to 
travel from Denver is 570 miles. The Affidavit sets forth 
the names of the witnesses and the nature and character 
of the testimony expcted to be given by them. Four of the 
witnesses allegedly required by the defendant were physic-
ians and surgeons residing in Denver, each of whom had 
previously treated the plaintiff for various ailments or for 
the injury sustained in the accident at Tabernash. The 
name of one of these doctors has not been ascertained at the 
time the Affidavit was made, but the nature of the testi-
mony expected to be given by him was outlined. It was 
further pointed out in the Affidavit that the doctors were 
private practitioners, actively engaged in the practice of 
their professions, and unwilling to leave their fields of 
practice and come to Salt Lake City, except by meeting 
their own terms of compensation and expense. It was also 
pointed out that none of the witnesses could be compelled 
by process to attend the trial in Salt Lake City, and that 
the plaintiff could obtain their services as witnesses only 
by meeting such terms as they saw fit to impose. A de-
tailed estimate of the cost to the defendant of defend.ing the 
plaintiff's claim in the District Court of Salt Lake County 
was set forth in the Affidavit, as well as the difference in 
the expense to the defendant in trying the plaintiff's case 
in Denver and in Salt Lake City. The Affidavit also pointed 
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out the desirability to the defendant of permitting the jury 
to inspect the car from which the plaintiff claimed to have 
been thrown by a defective brake. That the car was in the 
defendant's yards at Denver, and it could not be brought to 
Salt Lake City except at considerable expense and incon-
venience to the defendant. Finally, it was asserted that 
the trial of the case in the court where it was pending 
would add to the congestion of the calendar of that court 
and delay the trial of the cases involving local citizens and 
local problems of pressing importance, and also that it im-
posed an unnecessary and unjust burden upon the taxpayers 
of this State. 
Mr. Wayne L. Black, one of plaintiff's attorneys, filed 
on his behalf an Affidavit in opposition to the renewed 
Motion to Dismiss, in which virtually all of the material 
facts set forth in the defendant's Affidavit were denied. 
The issues raised by the Affidavit were set down for hear-
ing at which both parties appeared. At this hearing, the 
defendant put in evidence consisting of the testimony of 
Mr. Ashton, and a Certificate of the Clerk of the District 
Court of the Second Judicial District, City and County of 
Denver, State of Colorado. The plaintiff offered no evidence 
whatever. 
The Certificate of the clerk of the Colorado court intro-
duced in evidence by the defendant recited that any case set 
for trial at th-e time of his Certificate in either of two divi-
sions of the court of which he was Clerk could readily be 
tried within a period of three months if both sides diligently 
pursued the case to trial. That in the other three divisions 
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of his Court, under the circumstances above stated, cases 
could be tried within a period of not to exceed four and 
one-half months; that if the attorneys cooperated with the 
court a case after being set for trial can be disposed of by 
any one of the five divisions within a period of four and 
one-half months after the case has been set. That cases 
being filed can be put at issue within a period of two 
months, if there is no unreasonable delay caused by either 
party. The Certificate was dated December 11, 1950 (R. 
33). 
Mr. Ashton's testimony corroborated and established 
each of the facts recited in his Affidavit. He broke down 
the expense to the defendant of defending this action in 
the court in which it is pending. He itemized the fees of 
each witness which the defendant would be compelled to 
pay in order to obtain his attendance at the trial in Salt 
Lake City (R. 42-43). He based the estimates upon ex-
perience in other like cases, and pointed out the difficulties 
and uncertainties incident to producing these witnesses in 
Salt Lake City. Of course, none of them could be compelled 
to come to Salt Lake City, and in no event would any of 
the witnesses come here except upon such terms as each 
of them might impose. Assuming that the trial could be 
consummated in two days, Mr. Ashton computed the cost to 
the defendant of defending this action here at $1615.44. 
This item, however, did not cover the cost of transporting 
the witnesses from Denver to Salt Lake City. He consider-
ed that expense to the defendant to try the case in Denver 
would not exceed $350.00 (R. 44-5). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
28 
It was stipulated between the parties that Mr. Robert 
Olsen, who is a Deputy Clerk of Salt Lake County, would 
testify if called as a witness that the present condition of 
the calendar of the Third Judicial District was that on 
April1, there were approximately 110 cases ready for trial, 
and that on that day eighteen cases would be assigned to 
each of the five Judges for trial. 
On cross-examination Mr. Ashton admitted that he 
did not know in what County the accident to plaintiff oc-
curred, nor in which District Court that place might be 
located, or what the condition of the calendar in such Dis-
trict Court then was. He also admitted that it had not been 
necessary in the past for the defendant to produce any wit-
ness to testify to the earnings of a railroad employee in 
any action against the defendant tried in the courts of 
Utah, because the plaintiff in all cases in the past had 
stipulated to a tabulation of such earnings prepared by 
the defendant. He also admitted that under "the Labor 
Management Agreement railroad employees were required 
to attend court when requested by the management if they 
are paid the amount which they would have earned at work 
that day" (R. 53). 
In determining the factors which should control the 
discretion of the trial court to dismiss an action upon the 
ground of forum non conveniens, this Court has in its opin-
ion reversing the order of Judge Hendricks proceeded, we 
respectfully submit, upon an erroneous theory of that doc-
trine. It is not true that the plaintiff has a right to bring 
his action in this State. If he had any such right, obviously 
the courts of this State could have no discretion to deny it. 
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He gets into the courts of this State not by virtue of any 
right but solely by comity. He is not a resident of this 
State and contributes nothing to the heavy burden of main-
taining our courts. That burden is borne solely by the 
citidens of this State. He was not summoned into the courts 
of this State. He was not injured here, nor do any of his 
witnesses reside here, except one whom . he employed 
long after the injury occurred. It is obvious, and the plain-
tiff undoubtedly would confess, that his sole reason for 
invoking the jurisdiction of the courts of this State is that 
he considers them one of the "soft spots" in our judicial 
system. In such circumstances it is a perversion of the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens to say that the plaintiff 
has a right to come into the courts of this State, and that 
his convenience is to be considered in determining whether 
our courts should entertain his suit. The vital matter to be 
considered when confronted with such an attempt to trans-
port litigation is the convenience of the defendant, of the 
witnesses and the expense to the taxpayers of this State. 
This court in its opinion also st~tes that our courts 
should reject imported litigation only in exceptional cir-
cumstances. But the principle of forum non conveniens 
requires that the courts of a state entertain imported 
litigation only in exceptional circumstances. Such liti-
gation is necessarily a heavy inconvenience upon the 
defendant and to litigants of the state who help to bear the 
burden of maintaining the courts. This is not an isolated 
case of migratory litigation. As the records of this Court 
will disclose, it is a car in a long train of transported 
lawsuits. Such litigation thrives upon the indifference of 
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our courts to the rights of the taxpayers of this State and 
to the rights of local citizens. A proper application of the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens requires the rejection of 
all cases that are prosecuted here, solely because the plain-
tiff considers that the machinery of our courts has been 
geared to afford him greater relief than he can obtain in 
the courts of his own state. 
The evidence submitted by the defendant in support 
of its motion to dismiss was not in any manner contradicted, 
impeached, or impaired. It established that the defendant 
was required to incur great expense to defend the action 
in this State. It established that the defendant could not 
require the attendance of any of the witnesses necessary to 
establish its defense. It was compelled to rely upon their 
depositions, or meet any terms that they might impose as 
a condition to their attendance at the trial here. It estab-
lished that the defendant could not foresee the disad-
vantages and the difficulties it would be confronted with 
in defending the action far from the scene of the accident 
and the residence of the witnesses. A striking illustration 
of such disadvantage actually occurred. The original com-
plaint was founded solely upon an alleged violation by the 
defendant of the Safety Appliance Act. On the opening of 
the trial, the plaintiff was permitted to file an amendment 
to the complaint. In this amendment he set up a completely 
new theory of liability. He claimed that his accident and 
injury was caused by a violation of the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act. Had the defendant been confronted with 
such a situation in the courts of the state where the ac-
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cident occurred and where all of the witnesses resided, it 
could have investigated the facts on the ground and sum-
moned the additional witnesses necessary to meet it. Being 
confronted with the situation here, defendant was forced 
to rely upon the weaknesses of the plaintiff's testimony. 
Such situations are, of course, common in litigation, and 
the fact that they arise is a compelling reason why the 
courts of this State should not entertain this type of liti-
gation. 
The plaintiff submitted no evidence in opposition to 
the defendant's motion, although he put in issue substan-
tially all of the grounds alleged by the defendant in support 
of the motion. The trial court made no findings of fact 
nor conclusions of law on these contested issues, and there 
is no basis whatever in the evidence to support the ruling 
complained of. 
We respectfully submit that the court abused its dis-
cretion in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, appellant contends that there was no 
evidence to prove that it was negligent in failing to remove 
from the floor of the Jordan Spreader car "tools, chains, 
or other objects," or that its failure to do so caused in whole 
or in part the accident and injuries of which the plaintiff 
complains; that the evidence without conflict disclosed that 
the plaintiff fell from the car because of the action of the 
brake staff following the disengaging of the pawl from 
the ratchet, and for these reasons the trial court com-
mitted prejudicial error in permitting the jury to base 
a verdict against the defendant upon a ground of Jia.;. 
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bility unsupported by any evidence; that there was ample 
evidence to support a finding by the jury that the sole 
cause of the a~cident and injury sustained by the plaintiff 
was his failure to make use of the brake clu1b in releasing 
the brake as he had been instructed to do by his superior 
officer and as ordinary care would dictate, and for these 
reasons the court committed prejudicial error in refusing to 
submit this issue to the jury for its determination as re-
quested by the defendant; that the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act does not make the defendant an insurer of the 
safety of its employees, that liability under that Act is 
predicated upon negligence, that such negligence is not 
established by the fact that the employee may have been 
injured in the course of his employment, that the burden 
rested upon the plaintiff to prove that the defendant was 
negligent and that such negligence caused in whole or in 
part the accident and injury of which the plaintiff com-
plains, and the court committed prejudicial error in refus-
ing to apply these propositions of law to the evidence in 
this case as requested by the defendant; and finally that the 
trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the action upon the 
ground of forum non conveniens. Because of each. and all 
of the foregoing errors of the trial court, the judgment 
appealed from should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY, 
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON, 
Attorneys for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
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